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Courts are under a general obligation to develop common law by applying constitutional 
values as mandated by sections 8(3), 39(2) and 173 of the Constitution. There have been 
attempts by part of the judiciary and calls from legal commentators to develop the common 
law contractual doctrine of good faith. In particular, the question that has occupied judicial 
decision making and academic writing for some time now is whether the spirit, purport, and 
objects of our Constitution require courts to encourage good faith in contractual dealings or 
whether the Constitution insists that good faith requirements are enforceable. The 
Constitutional Court had an opportunity to settle this question in Everfresh Market Virginia 
(Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd
1
. This article argues that the Court wrongly decided 
that it was not in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal. Consequently, the Court’s 
misdirection and its refusal to refer the matter to the High Court to develop common law to 
require parties who undertake to negotiate a new term in a lease agreement to do so 
reasonably and in good faith resulted in the loss of a great opportunity to develop the 
common law.  
 
1   INTRODUCTION 
The role of the courts in developing the common law of contract in South Africa has assumed 
great importance and has of late become a subject that has occupied academic writing
2
 and 
judicial decision making.
3
 South African “superior courts have always had an inherent power 
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 Many writers have recently expressed views on the role of courts in developing the common law of contract. 
See for example, Brand “The role of good faith, equity and fairness in the South African Law of Contract: The 
influence of the common law and the Constitution” 2009 SALJ 71-90; Fagan “The secondary role of the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights in the common law’s development” 2010 SALJ 611-627; Campbell 
The cost of credit in the micro-finance industry in South Africa (LLM-thesis, Rhodes University, 2006) 6. See 
chapter two on “Fairness in the South African law of Contract” 6-44.  
3
 See the following cases where the role of the courts in developing common law in order to deal with 
contractual justice was an issue: Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal 
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to develop the common law in order to reflect the changing social, moral and economic make 
of the society”.4 What appears to have become contentious of late5 is whether this role to 
develop the common law (which common law has since been subsumed by the Constitution) 
is an obligation or merely discretionary when viewed in the light of relevant constitutional 
provisions.
6
 
 
This article critically analyses the decision of the majority in Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) 
Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd
7
 (hereafter Everfresh) in refusing the applicant leave to 
appeal and concluding that the case did not warrant remittal to the High Court and Supreme 
Court of Appeal to allow these courts to consider the question of the development of the 
common law of contract in accordance with section 39(2) of the Constitution. The critique 
will be presented in the light of the minority judgement of Yacoob J, minority views in 
relevant recent case law, the normative values of the Constitution and public policy
8
 
considerations. The thesis of this article is that the majority of the Constitutional Court in 
Everfresh incorrectly concluded that there was no need to develop common law, and in the 
process missed a good opportunity to play its obligatory role of developing the common law 
(particularly the principle of good faith which has been in dire need of development for more 
than a decade now).
9
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Studies Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) paras 54-6; Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA); Barkhuizen v 
Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 28-9; Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA). 
4
 See S v Theus 2003 6 SA 505 (CC) para 31. 
5
 See part 2.1.2 below for a brief consideration of the debate on whether the courts’ role to develop the common 
law is an obligation or simply discretionary, when viewed in the light of the Constitution. 
6
 The relevant constitutional provisions being sections 39(2) and 173 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
See part 2.1.2 in chapter two below for a more extensive discussion of these specific constitutional provisions. 
7
 2011 ZACC 30 
8
 See the definition of the concept “public policy” in 2.2 below 
9
 A gap has existed in the South African law of contract with respect to contractual equity, for example in 
situations where questions arise as to whether a contract can be enforced in circumstances which were not 
envisaged at the time it was made. Since the demise of the exceptio doli generalis in Bank of Lisbon and South 
Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA (A), there has been a call for the development of the common law doctrine 
of bona fides (good faith) to fill the gap in cases of contractual justice. See Lewis “The demise of the exceptio 
doli generalis: is there another route to contractual equity?” 1990 SALJ 26. One judge of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, Olivier JA, has fought a lone battle in the SCA to develop the common law concept of good faith. In 
Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Africa Bpk v Saayman 1997 4 SA 302 (A) his attempt failed. According 
to Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5 ed (2006) 16, the little gains his dissenting judgement in 
Saayman had made in some High Court decisions, were all eroded when in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 
(SCA) “the majority dismissed his views as those of a single judge and good faith could not be accepted as an 
independent basis for setting aside or enforcing contractual provisions”.  
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Common law can simply be defined to mean the law of the courts, or in other words the law 
made by the courts as opposed to the law made by the legislature.
10
 Courts or judges make 
law through interpreting already existing rules of law when settling disputes. Common law is 
an uncodified body of law
11
 from precedents of the courts that bind those courts or lower 
courts within the courts’ hierarchy system, a doctrine known as stare decisis. Brand J of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (hereafter SCA) opines that the system of developing common law 
through precedents has over the years provided the South African judiciary with a “medium 
to develop our system of uncodified common law”.12 By modifying, extending, or 
supplementing the common law principles, the courts seek to keep the law “in tune with 
changing social needs and values”,13 Brand J argues further. It is within this context that 
courts are expected to develop common law using the “objective normative value system” 
provided by the Constitution as per the Constitutional Court dicta in Carmichele v Minister of 
Safety and Security.
14
  
 
The article has basically five parts. The first part introduces the thesis of the article. The 
second part locates the analysis or discussion within the context of relevant legal framework 
and interrogates the question as to whether the role of courts in developing the common law 
of contract is obligatory or discretionary. In the third part, the background to the Everfresh 
case will be given (that is, the factual and legal issues in the case). The fourth part will 
analyse the judgement and provide a critique thereof in the light of the dissenting judgement 
in Everfresh, recent case law developments and public policy considerations. The fifth part is 
a conclusion. 
 
2  RELEVANT LEGISLATIVE AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
This discussion is located within the context of the constitutional framework. The supremacy 
of the Constitution,
15
 a celebrated development in South Africa, means that all laws enforced 
in South Africa and applied by the courts, including the common law of contract, now derives 
its force from the Constitution.
16
 Christie makes a valid point when stating that “the Bill of 
                                                          
10
 Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) 67. 
11
 Brand SALJ 72. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 56. 
15
 S 2 of the Constitution clearly provides thus, “The Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or 
conduct that is inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled”.  
16
 See the important dicta of Cameron JA in Brisley v Drotsky (fn 7 above). The judge confirms the position of s 
2 of the Constitution in 33F-G.   
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Rights in the 1996 Constitution has already had a considerable impact on the law of contract, 
and will continue to do so”.17  
 
The Constitution has impacted on the law of contract in some critical ways, two of which we 
will shortly turn to. Firstly, the Constitution has provided for horizontal application of the Bill 
of Rights and secondly, it provides for the constitutional mandate on courts to develop the 
common law in some of the provisions that will be discussed in 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 below. The 
link between public policy and the Constitution and its role thereof in the development of the 
common law will also be considered.  
 
2 1  Constitutional framework for developing common law of contract 
2 1 1  Horizontal application of the Bill of Rights 
The confusion that prevailed during the days of the Interim Constitution,
18
 as to whether the 
Bill of Rights has direct or indirect horizontal application to a contractual dispute between 
private parties, does not appear to have been completely resolved by the 1996 Constitution.
19
 
Dale Hutchison is one such author who expresses serious reservations regarding clarity of the 
position under the present Constitution.
20
 Giving a treatise on the debate around direct and 
indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights is beyond the scope of this article.
21
 
Suffice it to say though that it is now axiomatic from case law
22
 and the constitutional text 
that horizontal application with regard to private parties involved in a contractual dispute, for 
example, is now possible, but only to the extent that such horizontal application is permitted 
or qualified by the Bill of Rights itself.
23
 It is nonetheless clear from section 8(2) that not all 
fundamental rights bind persons in the private sphere. Application of certain classes of rights, 
like socio-economic rights for instance, can be invoked against the state as opposed to private 
individuals.  
 
                                                          
17
 Christie Contract 18. 
18
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
19
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
20
 Hutchison et al The Law of Contract in South Africa (2009) 35-36. 
21
 For a more in-depth discussion on the subject, see Cockrell “Private Law and the Bill of Rights: A Threshold 
Issue of Horizontality” in Y Mokgoro & P Tlakula (eds) Bill of Rights Compendium (1998) 3A9. Also refer to 
Hutchison Law of Contract 35-38. 
22
 In Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) the Constitutional Court ruled that even the interim 
constitution did apply to relations between private persons on the horizontal plane, but that in general it did so 
only indirectly, and not directly. See Hutchison Law of Contract 35.  
23
 S 8(2) provides for qualified horizontal application of the Bill of Rights in this way: “A provision of the Bill 
of Rights binds a natural or juristic person if, and to the extent that it is applicable, taking into account the 
nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.”  
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Barkhuizen v Napier
24
 is authority for the assertion that the Constitutional Court seems to 
prefer an interpretation of section 8(2) that points towards indirect application of the Bill of 
Rights when testing the constitutionality of a contractual term, since direct application, 
according to the judgement delivered on behalf of the majority by Ngcobo J, is fraught with 
difficulties.
25
 It can be discerned from Ngcobo’s judgement that the best approach to 
constitutional challenges to contractual terms is to determine whether the term challenged is 
contrary to public policy and for now, indirect application is best achieved via the 
development of the common law, first provided for within the context of section 8 (section 8 
(3) to be precise) of the Bill of Rights to which we will shortly turn
 26
.  
 
2 1 2  Constitutional mandate to develop common law of contract 
The Constitutional Court holds the view that the Constitution gives a general mandate to 
courts to develop the common law. This position was strongly conveyed in Carmichele as 
follows: 
“It needs to be stressed that the obligation of courts to develop the common law, in 
the context of the section 39(2) objectives, is not purely  discretionary. On the 
contrary it is implicit in section 39(2) read with section 173 that where the common 
law as it stands is deficient in promoting the section 39(2) objectives, the courts are 
under a general obligation to develop it appropriately.”27 
 
It is important at this stage to point out that the courts’ “obligation” to develop the common 
law in order to promote the objectives of sections 39(2)
28
 and 173
29
 of the Constitution is to 
be found from within the Bill of Rights in sections that come earlier than sections 39(2) and 
                                                          
24
 See fn 2 above.  
25
 See Ngcobo J’s judgement in Barkhuizen v Napier paras 23-30. 
26
 While for now courts may be more comfortable with indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to 
contractual disputes which implicate constitutional rights, the door is left open for courts to directly intervene 
if a party to a contract exercised a contractual power in a manner that failed to respect the constitutional rights 
of the other party. The Southern Gauteng High Court recently did that in Breedenkamp v Standard Bank of 
South Africa Ltd 2009/7907 when Jajbhay J granted an interdict against the bank, restraining it from unfairly 
cancelling the applicant’s bank account, going against a provision in the contract that gave the bank the power 
to cancel “for any reason”. Also see Cockrell “Second-guessing the exercise of contractual power on 
rationality grounds” 1997 Acta Juridica 26.  
27
 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (see fn 2 above) para 39. 
28
 S 39(2) provides thus, “When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.”  
29
 S 173 provides as follows: “The Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have the 
inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into account 
the interests of justice.” 
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173. The clearest of the mandate on courts to develop the common law when applying the 
Bill of Rights to a practical situation where violation of a right is alleged, comes from section 
8(3).
30
 This provision is of the essence that when a court of law applies a right in the Bill of 
Rights in a private sphere (horizontal application), it must do so through the medium of the 
common law, and must develop common law by adapting, modifying or supplementing its 
rules where necessary to fill a gap in the law (the law of contract in this instance). It has been 
argued that common law of contract in particular is “shot through with open-ended concepts 
such as good faith, public policy, and reasonableness … malleable standards [which] afford 
[courts of law] ready and convenient means of infusing the law of contract with the spirit and 
values of the Constitution”.31  
 
According to the Constitutional Court, when fulfilling the mandate or obligation to develop 
the common law, courts of law do not have to wait for a perfect opportunity or a moment 
where “some startling development of the common law is in issue, but in all cases where the 
incremental development of a common law rule is in issue”.32 In addition, where a court 
realises the need to develop the common law in a particular case in order to fill a gap in law, 
such a court does not always have to rely on litigants to make a relevant allegation regarding 
the need to develop a common law rule in the interests of justice, but can under certain 
circumstances intervene of its own accord.
33
 What is expected of the courts in keeping with 
their constitutional mandate to develop the common law is to be at all times “alert to the 
normative framework of the Constitution”.34 
 
The author recognises that there is an alternative view to the increasingly general 
understanding that courts in South Africa are enjoined by the Constitution to develop the 
common law whenever it falls short of the spirit, purport, and objects of the Constitution. 
While the Constitutional Court
35
 may consider the position regarding courts’ mandate to 
                                                          
30
 S 8(3)(a) states that “When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of 
the subsection (2), a court – 
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill of Rights, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common 
law  to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; 
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in accordance 
with section 36(1)”.  
31
 Hutchison Law of Contract 36. My emphasis. 
32
 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC) para 17. 
33
 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (see fn 26 above) is authority for this assertion. 
34
 See K v Minister of Safety and Security, fn 31 above, para 17. 
35
 Including other stakeholders who are converted to the conviction that there exists a constitutional mandate on 
courts to develop the common law within the context of s 8(3), s 39(2), and s 173 of the Constitution.  
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develop common law as trite, the question is not without difficulty or even controversy for 
other academics and legal commentators. Professor Antony Fagan argues that contrary to the 
Constitutional Court’s assertion in Carmichele,36 “the Constitution does not oblige courts to 
develop the common law whenever it falls short of the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill 
of Rights”.37   
 
Fagan further contends that the Constitution does not even regard the spirit, purport, and 
objects of the Bill of Rights as reasons for the development of the common law, but only as 
reasons for choosing between several alternative ways of developing the common law.
38
  
  
Another professor and seasoned legal practitioner, Halton Cheadle, supports Fagan’s view, 
and adds that the wording of sections 39(2) and 173 of the Constitution cannot be read to 
imply an obligation to develop common law, since in Cheadle’s view “both logic and the 
rules of statutory interpretation set their face against deriving an obligation from a power”.39 I 
am prepared to agree with Fagan only on the point that section 39(2) requires a court to 
promote the objects of the Bill of Rights not only when developing the common law but also 
when interpreting any legislation. Indeed the focus of section 39 is the interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights.
40
 
 
I am, however, unable to agree with the argument by Professor Fagan that there is no 
discernible obligation on courts to develop common law from the reading of sections 8(3), 
39(2) and 173 of the Constitution. A proper construction and understanding of section 8(3)(a) 
of the Constitution should lead to a conclusion that courts are mandated to develop the 
common law of contract in a situation where a constitutional right is implicated in a 
contractual dispute, for example.
41
 Section 39(2), flowing from the above construction, can 
be understood to be a directive on courts to ensure that the common law is infused with the 
values of the Constitution, and can be interpreted to be therefore giving the courts an indirect 
obligation to develop the common law. It is important to note that the said constitutional 
                                                          
36
 See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security para 39 
37
 Fagan 2010 SALJ 612   
38
 See fn 36 above. According to Fagan, the Constitution only recognises the following as possible reasons for 
developing common law: (1) the rights in the Bill of Rights; (2) justice; and (3) the rules of the common law 
itself. See  Fagan 2010 SALJ 612 
39
 Cheadle “Application” in Cheadle, Davis, and Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 2 
ed (2005) 3-11. 
40
 Fagan 2010 SALJ 620. 
41
 See 2.1.2 above for details of and a commentary on sections 8(3)(a), 39(2) and 173. 
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mandate on courts to develop the common law whenever the courts find it necessary to do so 
in applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a set of facts, is couched in a peremptory word 
“must” and not optional words like “may” or even “should”.42  
  
It is further contended that, from the premise that the Constitution is supreme law and all law 
now derives its force from it,
43
 it should be more logical to conclude that the relevant Bill of 
Rights sections give courts an obligation to develop the common law than believing that such 
obligation emanates from anywhere else but the Constitution. In other words, despite the 
contrary views of authors like Fagan, this author firmly agrees with the view of the 
Constitutional Court that the duty of courts to develop the common law whenever it falls 
short of the spirit and purport of the Bill of Rights is obligatory and not discretionary as 
demonstrated above.   
 
2 2  Relevance of public policy considerations 
Doctrine of public policy, while difficult to comprehensively define, can be understood to 
refer to courts’ considerations of what is in the interests of the society or community44 when 
interpreting contracts. 
 
Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes
45
 is one of the leading cases on contracts that are contrary to public 
policy and is also considered the starting point of the modern law of illegality or 
unenforceability of contracts by common law. According to Christie, since Drotsky
46
 and 
Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom
47
  [unfortunately] “rejected good faith in favour of public 
policy,
48
 Sasfin has become the leading authority for testing the enforceability of contracts 
which in other jurisdictions
49
 would raise questions of good faith. Smalberger JA in his 
judgement in Sasfin stated the importance of interests of the community to public policy. His 
remark that “no court should … shrink from the duty of declaring a contract contrary to 
                                                          
42
 See s 8(3)(a) in fn 29 above. 
43
 Brisley v Drotsky para 33F-G 
44
 Something akin to the concept “public interest”, a term that is sometimes used interchangeably with the 
phrase “interests of the community”. 
45
 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A). 
46
 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA). 
47
 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA). 
48
 Christie Contract 347. 
49
 A good example is the Germany jurisdiction where a contract can be struck down if it is contrary to the notion 
of good faith, while in South Africa a contract has to be repugnant to public policy to suffer similar 
consequences. See Braun Policing Standard Form Contracts in Germany and South Africa: A Comparison 
(LLM-thesis University of Cape Town, 2005) 64. 
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public policy when the occasion so demands”, has become celebrated in South Africa’s 
superior courts. 
 
Interests of the society are dynamic and never static.
50
 As society progresses, its needs and 
value system change in sync with changing times. To this extent, public policy assumes new 
scope and content at every milestone stage of the development of a society. Since the Bill of 
Rights in the South African Constitution “is the most recent expression of the values upheld 
in our society”,51 it can be correctly regarded, in the words of Christie, as an “exceptionally 
reliable statement of seriously considered public opinion”.52 Today, public policy, which “in 
its modern guise ... is rooted in our Constitution and the fundamental values it enshrines”,53 
has the following content and objectives to achieve: human dignity, achievement of equality, 
advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism.  
 
The value and relevance of public policy to this article is to be seen in the light of the reality 
that courts in South Africa appear to favour public policy as an instrument for handling cases 
of contractual unfairness that cannot satisfactorily be handled by existing rules.
54
 Some 
commentators who see an important role for good faith in contract law have been left 
disappointed by the fact that for many years the courts have shown a preference for public 
policy, itself an abstract concept, and have refused to see the need to develop the common 
law concept of good faith.
55
 
 
2 3  Enforceability of a duty to negotiate in good faith – the lacuna  
The enforceability of a general duty to negotiate in good faith in the context of an agreement 
to agree at a future date remains a grey area in South African law of contract. It has led 
writers to search for answers through some scholarly publications.
56
 Cases discussed below 
show the different classes of agreements to agree present in South African law. Courts of law 
have adopted different approaches when dealing with such agreements, especially when 
                                                          
50
 Christie Contract 348. 
51
 Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles 3 ed (2007) 18. 
52
 Christie “The Law of Contract and the Bill of Rights” in  Mokgoro and Tlakula (eds) Bill of Rights 
Compendium (2006) 3H8.   
53
 See statement of Cameron JA in Brisley v Drotsky fn 7 above para 34H-35B. 
54
 Christie Contract 16. 
55
 See Bhana and Pieterse “Towards a Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and 
Afrox Revisited” 2006 SALJ 894; Cockrell “Substance in the South African Law of Contract” 1992 SALJ 109; 
Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 6 ed (2002). 
56
 Andrew Hutchison in his article “Agreements to agree: Can there ever be an enforceable duty to negotiate in 
good faith?” 2011 SALJ 273-296 asks a very pertinent question in this regard. 
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attempting to answer the question as to whether a duty to negotiate in good faith is 
enforceable in our law. 
 
The different approaches are clear when courts are faced with agreements to agree where 
preliminary agreements or arrangements in the existing contract contain some deadlock-
breaking mechanisms and in cases where such mechanisms are absent. For example, in 
Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet
57
 a binding preliminary agreement which 
contained open terms as to the conditions of a future lease of a defined property was held by 
the court to be valid and enforceable. In Letaba Sawmills (Edms) Bpk v Majovi (Edms) Bpk
58
 
an option to renew a lease agreement at a rental to be negotiated in future was considered 
enforceable by the court. It appears that the courts found it easier to enforce the duty to 
negotiate in good faith in these two cases due to the presence of an arbitration clause which 
required parties to approach an arbitrator for resolution in case of a dispute. As per Ponnan 
AJA’s dicta in Southernport, the work of the courts was made easier by the fact that the 
arbitrator had the task of simply “ … putting the flesh onto the bones of a contract already 
concluded by the parties”.59 In light of these recent cases, it can be concluded that there is 
authority in South Africa that the presence of an arbitration clause in an agreement imposing 
on the parties a duty to negotiate in good faith makes the agreement enforceable.
60
 
 
Difficulties appear to arise when there is no “deadlock-breaking mechanism” in a preliminary 
agreement or an arrangement like the one found in Lethaba (an “arrangement” or agreement 
to renew a lease at a rental to be negotiated). Despite clear intentions of parties to be bound 
by a duty to negotiate in good faith present or implied in their agreement, courts have been 
hesitant to enforce such agreements in the absence of an arbitration clause or any other form 
of a deadlock-breaking mechanism.
61
 This is the present state of South African law regarding 
this category of agreements to agree. There is reluctance by courts to intervene, even where 
there is a strong call for intervention to prevent contractual injustice. Such a state of affairs 
                                                          
57
 Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet 2005 92 SA 202 (SCA). Also see Hutchison (2011) SALJ 
275. 
58
 Letaba Sawmills (Edms) Bpk v Majovi (Edms) Bpk 1996 2 SA 225 (A) in Hutchison (2011) SALJ 275. 
59
 Southernport para 17. 
60
 Hutchison (2011) SALJ 274. 
61
 In Premier Free State v Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd 2000 4 SA 413 (SCA) an agreement without an 
arbitration clause was held to be an unenforceable “agreement to agree”. See Hutchison (2011) SALJ 275 
where another case of H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd is discussed. In this case, an 
agreement to increase the sale price from time to time was held to be unenforceable because no deadlock-
breaking mechanism existed to break the stalemate between the parties. In its absence, the court refused to 
interfere with the parties’ freedom to contract. 
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appears to work in favour of a recalcitrant party who can always find it easy to argue that a 
promise to negotiate in good faith is too illusory or too vague and uncertain to be 
enforceable.
62
 What is therefore the remedy for a party who is affected by the other party’s 
refusal to negotiate in good faith? Is a court of law obliged to develop the common law of 
good faith beyond precedent to impose a duty on a recalcitrant party to negotiate in good faith 
even in the absence of an arbitration clause? These are the critical questions that faced the 
Constitutional Court in Everfresh.   
 
3  Background to Everfresh (Factual and Legal issues) 
3 1  Factual Issues 
The case is a result of an ejectment application in the High Court
63
 by the respondent 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd (hereafter Shoprite) against applicant, Everfresh Market Virginia 
(Pty) Ltd
64
 (hereafter Everfresh). The business relationship between the two was established 
by means of good faith negotiations between Everfresh and Shoprite’s predecessor in title 
that resulted in a lease agreement for the rental of a portion of the Virginia Shopping Centre 
by Everfresh. Shoprite bought this property from the original lessor
65
 during the currency of 
the lease, and Shoprite therefore became bound by the lease, effectively becoming 
Everfresh’s lessor. 
 
The lease was for five years between 1 April 2004 and 31 March 2009. The lease gave the 
lessee a right to renew the lease for a similar duration under similar conditions, subject to the 
lessee giving the lessor written notice of such intention to renew at least 6 calendar months 
prior to termination of the lease. The agreement had a clause that provided for the parties to 
negotiate and agree on a rental fee at renewal. In due course Everfresh elected to exercise the 
right to renew the lease agreement, and duly notified Shoprite of its intentions to do so on 14 
July 2008, and further proposed a reasonable rental fee escalation of 10.5% per annum in line 
with the existing lease.  
 
                                                          
62
 This is the position adopted by Shoprite in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited v Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) 
Limited Case No 6675/09, KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Pietermaritzburg (25-05-2010), unreported. When 
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Shoprite, however, rejected Everfresh’s proposal for lease renewal, and on 3 September 2008 
wrote back to Everfresh advising it that according to its understanding, the lease agreement 
did not impose any contractual obligation on the lessor to extend the lease agreement. 
Shoprite further advised Everfresh that the lease agreement would accordingly terminate on 
31 March 2009. When that date arrived, Everfresh did not vacate the premises. Shoprite then 
instituted ejectment proceedings in the High Court, arguing that it was not obliged to enter 
into negotiations and that Everfresh was in unlawful occupation. Everfresh in its affidavit 
opposing ejectment, contended that the terms of the agreement precluded Shoprite from 
frustrating its qualified right to renew by refusing to negotiate in good faith. 
 
The High Court rejected Everfresh’s argument as bad in law and Shoprite succeeded in its 
ejectment claim.
66
 Both the High Court and the SCA refused Everfresh’s application for leave 
to appeal, hence the Constitutional Court challenge. 
 
3 2  The Legal Issues  
The Constitutional Court (hereafter the Court)
67
 in Everfresh had to deal with three central 
legal issues, with a few questions connected to the main legal issues also requiring the 
decision of the Court. The first legal question which the Court had to decide on is whether a 
constitutional matter was being raised when Everfresh requested the Court to develop the 
common law in the light of section 39(2) of the Constitution in order for the common law to 
require parties who undertake to negotiate a new term in a lease agreement to do so 
reasonably and in good faith.
68
 The Court was unanimous that a constitutional matter was 
thus being raised.  
 
Secondly, the Court had to decide whether it was in the interests of justice to grant Everfresh 
leave to appeal.
69
 Though the Court was divided on whether it was in the interests of justice 
to grant leave to appeal against the decision of the High Court and the SCA, it was 
unanimous on the fact that Everfresh had not made a very relevant allegation that it was in 
the interests of justice for the court to grant leave to appeal. In the end, the majority decided 
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that everything militated against granting leave to appeal,
70
 while the minority held that 
despite Everfresh’s failure to properly canvass the issue, it was generally in the interests of 
justice to grant leave to appeal, given the importance of developing the common law of 
contract.
71
 
 
Thirdly, the Court had to decide on whether an obligation existed for the Court to remit the 
matter to the High Court for the purpose of developing the common law in light of the “spirit, 
purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights”.72 In relation to this point, the Constitutional Court 
had to consider the prospects of success if Everfresh’s challenge was to be remitted to the 
High Court to reconsider the question of the development of common law. The majority 
sharply differed with the minority on this point and decided that it was not in the interests of 
justice and fairness to remit the matter back to the High Court. In coming to the above 
decision, the majority had to consider whether the claim to develop the common law had 
been raised for the first time in the Court,
73
 and ruled that not only had Everfresh altered its 
defences as it went along, but also failed to raise any of the constitutional points in the High 
Court and SCA.  
 
4  Analysis of the Everfresh judgement  
4 1  The Everfresh judgement  
The Constitutional Court majority judgement in Everfresh was delivered by Moseneke DCJ, 
with Ngcobo CJ, Cameron J, Jafta J, Khampepe J, Nkabinde J, and Van der Westhuizen J 
concurring. Yacoob J led the dissenting (minority) judgement, with Froneman J, Mogoeng J, 
and Mthiyane AJ concurring. In an eight-to-four decision, the Court refused to grant leave to 
appeal and accordingly the matter was not remitted to the High Court to consider the question 
of the development of the common law.
74
 This decision was obviously not unanimous. What 
follows below is a discussion of the ratio decidendi and how the Court arrived at its decision.  
 
In the main, the Court’s decision to refuse the applicant leave to appeal was for the reason 
that it was not in the interests of justice to do so. According to the judgement delivered by 
Moseneke DCJ for the majority, a careful balancing of various factors had to be done in order 
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to determine the exact content of interests of justice in this case.
75
 Thus, in Moseneke DCJ’s 
view, it was fatal to the application brought by Everfresh, that the applicant failed to allege, 
either in its application for leave to appeal in the High Court and SCA or in its written 
argument before the Constitutional Court, that it was in the interests of justice for the Court to 
hear its appeal.
76
 It was further found not to be in the interests of justice for the Court to grant 
Everfresh leave to appeal because the applicant’s defence to Shoprite’s claim for eviction, 
according to the majority, had changed over time to the prejudice of the respondent 
(Shoprite). Moseneke DCJ argued that “Everfresh’s case had ... taken different forms in 
different forums, and sometimes in the same forum.”77 It is interesting that Moseneke DCJ, in 
making the above comment, inadvertently referred to the defences that Everfresh had put up 
in the High Court against Shoprite’s eviction claim. The defences presented by Everfresh in 
the High Court, as Moseneke DCJ acknowledges, were rooted in the proper interpretation of 
clause 3
78
 of the contract.
79
 Everfresh’s alternative defence was that clause 3 of the lease at 
least created a positive duty on Shoprite to negotiate with Everfresh for the renewal of the 
lease in good faith.
80
  
 
While Everfresh was forced to abandon its main defence presented in the High Court, it 
continued with its alternative defence, which argument was now buttressed by the request to 
the Constitutional Court to develop the contractual common law principle of good faith in 
line with the “spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights”.81 The Court, per Moseneke 
DCJ, concluded that good faith was too illusory to be ascertainable or enforceable even if it 
was to be concluded that the lease contained a promise from the lessor to the lessee to 
negotiate in good faith, “such a promise, assuming it to be one to negotiate in good faith, 
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 Clause 3 of the lease partly read, “Provided that the Lessee has faithfully and timeously fulfilled and 
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which by its very nature, purpose and context is simply too vague and uncertain to be 
enforceable”.82  
 
The Court also reasoned that because, in its view, the claim to develop the common law was 
raised by the applicant Everfresh for the first time in the Constitutional Court, the interests of 
justice point towards the application falling to fail. Using case law,
83
 Moseneke DCJ ruled 
that it was not desirable to grant leave to appeal where an applicant failed to raise the 
development of the common law in the High Court, and only does so in the Constitutional 
Court.
84
 Though the Court held unanimously that Everfresh’s claim to have common law of 
contract developed presented a constitutional case of substance,
85
 the majority ruled that 
without the benefit of the views of the High Court and SCA, it was not in the interests of 
justice for the Court to hear the claim as a court of first and last instance. The reason 
advanced for this finding being that no special circumstances existed for the Court to hear the 
matter as a court of first instance.
86
 The correctness of the position adopted by the majority in 
this regard is debatable, as will be demonstrated in 4.2 below. 
 
The final reason advanced by the Court for refusing to grant leave to appeal was that there 
were no prospects of success in the case argued before it by Everfresh, and the Court 
accordingly declined to refer the matter to the High Court or SCA to consider the question of 
the development of common law as requested by Everfresh.
87
 It is surprising that Moseneke 
DCJ arrived at this finding notwithstanding a concession that there exists a possibility of “...  
more than one plausible interpretation of the clause and that Everfresh’s argument may 
therefore not be without some prospect of success”.88 The Court established an interlink of 
key contractual principles relevant to Everfresh’s argument. These include the underlying 
notion of good faith in contract law (bona fides), the maxim of the contractual doctrine pacta 
sunt servanda
89
 and the value of ubuntu, which as Moseneke DCJ acknowledged, “... inspire 
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much of our constitutional compact ... ”90 The Deputy Chief Justice further remarked that 
such contractual principles had the potential to tilt the argument in Everfresh’s favour, and 
that “where there is a contractual obligation to negotiate ... our constitutional values would ... 
require that the negotiation be done reasonably, with a view to reaching an agreement and in 
good faith”.91 Despite all these comments from Moseneke DCJ, which appeared to favour 
Everfresh’s case, the majority reached a conclusion that the applicant had failed to convince 
the Court that prospects of success existed. 
 
Having gleaned over the judgement presented by Moseneke DCJ and the important 
admissions he made as highlighted above, it is difficult for one not to wonder why the Court 
arrived at the decision that it reached regarding refusing to grant leave to appeal and refusing 
to remit the case to the High Court and SCA to consider developing common law. Despite 
conceding that the case presented by Everfresh is not without prospects of success, that the 
case bears a constitutional issue of importance and that the Constitution requires negotiations 
to be done in good faith, Moseneke still ruled against Everfresh’s claim to have common law 
developed in light of section 39(2) requirements in order to require parties who undertake to 
negotiate a new term in a lease agreement to do so reasonably and in good faith. 
 
It is important to also note that no attempt was made by the Court to reflect on the current 
trend in South African law to make a promise to negotiate in good faith enforceable where 
there is the presence of a deadlock mechanism like an arbitration clause. Little attempt was 
also made by the Court to explain why a conclusion was reached to say that the promise to 
negotiate in good faith in Everfresh was too illusory and uncertainable to be enforced by the 
Court. It needs to be noted that Everfresh and Shoprite had a contract in place, which contract 
was negotiated on the basis of good faith, and became the vehicle for an “agreement to agree” 
or  to negotiate a rental fee in future at renewal. It is difficult to understand why the Court 
only referred to cases (Southernport and foreign case law in this regard)
92
 which supported 
the conclusion which the majority favoured, to the effect that the promise to negotiate was 
too illusory and uncertain to be enforceable. The omission by the majority to clearly show 
that there is case law that suggests that it is possible in South African law to enforce a duty to 
negotiate in good faith in certain circumstances, does raise eyebrows. As discussed in 2.3 
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above, the case of Southernport employed by Moseneke DCJ in his judgement, as well as 
Litaba (which was disappointingly never referred to), demonstrate the potential which exists 
in South African law to develop a duty to negotiate in good faith into an independent rule to 
ensure contractual justice in line with the section 39(2) objectives.       
 
Another rationale for the Court’s decision to refuse Everfresh’s request for the development 
of common law was that the applicant (Everfresh) failed to properly argue its case before the 
Court, and in Moseneke DCJ’s own words, “had the case been properly pleaded, a number of 
inter-linking constitutional values would inform a development of the common law”.93 
 
4 2   A Critique of Everfresh in light of Yacoob J’s dissenting judgment  
From the analysis of the outcome, which the majority favoured in Everfresh given in 4.1 
above, it can be deciphered that there was potential for a different outcome. A different 
outcome was possible if, firstly, the Court had been more alert to its constitutional mandate to 
develop the common law in light of the section 39(2) objectives. Secondly, it can be argued 
that a different result could have been achieved if the Court had not misdirected itself when 
making decisions on key legal issues. It therefore comes as no surprise that there is an 
alternative view and a different outcome favoured by part of the same Court, in the form of 
the minority’s dissenting judgement presented by Yacoob J.94 I will briefly consider the 
points at which the Court misdirected itself and demonstrate how a different approach to the 
key legal issues could have resulted in a different outcome in Everfresh. The minority 
judgement of Yacoob J is critical in this regard and shall be referred to from time to time in 
this critique. 
 
The rationale for the Court’s ruling that despite the applicant in Everfresh raising a 
constitutional matter of substance, it was not in the interests of justice for the Court to hear 
the matter as a Court of first instance,
95
 is highly contestable. As argued by Yacoob J, the fact 
that Everfresh failed to argue the need for development of the common law before the High 
Court should not bar it from arguing the matter before the Constitutional Court as Court of 
first instance, provided that there was no prejudice to be suffered by Shoprite.
96
 Could it be 
gainsaid that there was a possibility of prejudice to Shoprite in a situation where the facts 
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argued before the High Court and the Constitutional Court were basically the same facts, save 
that Everfresh’s argument was now buttressed by a request to the Constitutional Court to 
develop the duty to negotiate in good faith beyond precedent? As argued by Yacoob J, there 
is no possibility of prejudice since the matters raised were not matters that Shoprite could not 
traverse since they were all common cause.
97
  
 
Again, the majority’s argument that it could not hear the argument to develop common law as 
court of first instance because Everfresh failed to raise the constitutional matter before the 
High Court and SCA, is difficult to reconcile with the reality of Everfresh’s argument before 
the Court. Despite Everfresh’s failure to mention by name the need to develop common law 
before the High Court, Everfresh raised a matter laced with constitutional implications before 
the High Court when it argued that Shoprite had an obligation to negotiate in good faith. 
Yacoob J correctly states that raising the argument of a duty to negotiate in good faith does 
“by necessary implication raise issues of public policy … which issues … in turn cannot be 
considered without reference to section 39(2)”98 of the Constitution. The Court’s conclusion 
that no special circumstances existed to justify remitting the matter to the High Court to 
consider the question of developing common law
99
 was, in line with this construction, also 
very surprising.
100
 This outcome was favoured by the Court despite its earlier 
acknowledgement that the Constitution requires parties to an agreement to conduct their 
relationship, including negotiations, reasonably and in good faith.
101
 Yet before the Court, 
Everfresh brought a request for the Court to adapt the common law in line with the “spirit, 
purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights”102 to ensure that an agreement to negotiate made in 
good faith is rendered enforceable. At common law, the current position appears to be that an 
agreement or promise to negotiate and agree on an element of a contract in future is 
unenforceable in the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism, despite the parties’ 
intentions to be bound by such an agreement.
103
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Considering that contractual fairness and justice are values that the Constitution, supreme law 
of the land, holds dearly, it cannot be gainsaid that refusal to allow for the development of 
common law to infuse it with the values of the Bill of Rights is consistent with public policy 
considerations and the Constitution. Not even the reasons proffered by the Court, namely, 
firstly, that it was deprived of the views of the High Court and SCA; secondly, because of the 
reason that the matter was being raised for the first time in the Constitutional Court; and 
thirdly, that granting the appeal would prejudice Shoprite, are good enough grounds to have 
prevented the Court from considering the crucial matter that Everfresh brought before it.
104
  
 
Contrary to Moseneke DCJ’s assertion that no exceptional circumstances existed to allow the 
Court to intervene or require the High Court to intervene of its own accord and develop the 
common law as requested by the applicant, it was arguably implicit in Everfresh that the 
common law concept of good faith required development in order to align it with the 
emerging new contractual constitutional order.
105
 In contrast to Moseneke DCJ’s comments, 
Yacoob J, who presented the dissenting minority judgement, saw Everfresh’s proposal to 
adapt the common law in different light. Yacoob J was of the view that a proposition for a 
common law contract principle that provides meaningful parameters to render an agreement 
to negotiate in good faith enforceable is decidedly more consistent with section 39(2) than 
one which is not.
106
 In addition, Yacoob noted that not only was Everfresh’s proposition in 
line with constitutional ethos, but also that it was consistent with principles like the sanctity 
of contract and the important moral denominator of good faith.
107
 It is an already established 
principle in South African law that every contract is deemed to be bona fidei, which involves 
good faith as a criterion for interpreting a contract.
108
  
 
Why was it necessary for the Court to have seriously considered developing common law 
relating to a promise to negotiate in good faith as urged upon by Everfresh? An answer could 
be found in the particular circumstances of the case. In the circumstances of Everfresh, two 
parties (the original lessor and lessee) had created rights and obligations in clause 3 of the 
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contract and had the necessary animus contrahendi
109
 to be bound by an agreement signed in 
good faith. Despite their intentions, enforcement of the rights and obligations so created by 
clause 3 of the lease agreement was frustrated by a common law rule that does not yet 
consider a promise or duty to negotiate in good faith enforceable, especially in the absence of 
a deadlock-breaking mechanism such as an arbitration clause.
110
 Shoprite, who became a 
successor in title,
111
 spotted the gap in common law and decided to exploit it in order to 
escape from its obligations that were created by the good faith negotiations concluded 
between the original lessor and Everfresh.
112
  
 
It is not difficult to see that Shoprite took advantage of the undeveloped common law of 
contract as pointed out above.
113
 Shoprite’s action was motivated by a desire to pursue a new 
business direction.
114
 This desire could have been frustrated had Shoprite chosen to be bound 
by the good faith “obligation” to negotiate with Everfresh. Shoprite had discovered that after 
all, such an obligation was not enforceable at common law as it stood at the time
115
 and sadly, 
as it still stands today.
116
 It is this anomaly that Everfresh sought to persuade the Court to 
correct by developing the common law contractual doctrine of good faith so that promises to 
negotiate reasonably and in good faith can become enforceable. Sadly, the Court failed to see 
any exceptional grounds to hear this important claim to develop the common law as a court of 
first instance. The Court then non-suited Everfresh on slender grounds such as Everfresh’s 
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alleged failure to make this claim in the High Court first and its omission to allege that it was 
in the interests of justice for the Court to hear the claim.  
 
The Court’s reasoning that Everfresh’s application fell to fail for the reason that the claim to 
develop the common law was raised for the first time in the Court, could be found to be not 
consistent with what the Constitution provides for. It is not inconceivable under the 
Constitution or rules of the Constitutional Court that applicants can bring their applications 
directly to the Constitutional Court. Section 167(6) of the Constitution in fact allows for 
direct approach and appeal to the Constitutional Court when it is in the interests of justice for 
parties to do so.
117
 Non-suiting Everfresh on the ground that the development was raised for 
the first time in the Constitutional Court was not only unfair. If anything, it could even be 
found to be a contestable limitation of Everfresh’s right of access to courts,118 when viewed 
in the light of section 167. Yacoob J probably had this in mind when he made the following 
important dicta in his dissenting judgement: 
“The mere fact that the constitutional dimensions of the development point were not 
raised in the High Court or Supreme Court of Appeal is no bar to considering the legal 
point on appeal to this Court, provided that the pleaded and established facts allow 
this without prejudice to the opposing parties.”119 
 
In deciding against remitting the matter to the High Court to consider the question of 
development of the common law, the Court appears to have been fixated on avoiding 
prejudice to Shoprite. Regrettably, this was also misdirection on the part of the Court and it 
shifted its focus away from what, in my view, mattered more, that is, the Court’s obligation to 
develop the common law. I agree with Yacoob J in this regard that there is no discernible 
prejudice where a matter was to be decided by the Court on the facts pleaded and accepted in 
the High Court. Everfresh was not seeking to rely for its case in the Constitutional Court on 
facts that were not pleaded in the High Court. The facts were basically common cause as 
already argued above.
120
 There was no introduction of new facts that, contrary to Moseneke 
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DCJ’s assertion,121 would prejudice Shoprite because it would not have had the opportunity 
to traverse them. Even if the Court had found that the legal argument advanced by Everfresh 
on appeal in the Court was different to the one advanced during the trial court, the Court 
would still have been obliged to decide on the correct legal interpretation of a contract where 
the facts that form the basis of the interpretation are common cause.
122
  
 
It could be helpful at this stage to summarise the efficacy of Yacoob J’s dissenting judgement 
and why it is contended that it presented a convincing alternative to the outcome favoured by 
the majority. I should state that the judgement of Yacoob J strikes me as a more balanced and 
thoroughly reasoned outcome as compared to the majority ruling that appeared to be more 
alive to the prejudice to Shoprite than any kind of contractual unfairness to Everfresh. This is 
just one example of how Yacoob J appeared to have carefully analysed the strengths and 
weaknesses of the applicant’s case and the respondent’s defence before making a finding that 
it was in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal: The learned judge was not oblivious 
to the weaknesses in each party’s case. With respect to Everfresh’s case, Yacoob J did not 
mince his words as he castigated the applicant for its failure to traverse the interests of justice 
in its application for leave to appeal,
123
 and further expressed displeasure at the manner 
Everfresh conducted its case.
124
 In particular, Yacoob J criticised the manner in which 
Everfresh changed its arguments in the High Court. This, however, needs to be 
counterbalanced by the fact that despite all this, and as Yacoob J acknowledges, Everfresh 
maintained its main argument between the High Court and the Constitutional Court. 
Everfresh’s contention that the contract obliged Shoprite to negotiate in good faith was made 
consistently.
125
 With respect to Shoprite’s case, Yacoob J was clear that he did not accept that 
a party to a contract should be allowed to “ignore detailed provisions of a contract as though 
they had never been written”126 and I would dare add, agreed upon in good faith. Yacoob J 
warned that if that were to be allowed to happen, it would be found to be “less consistent with 
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that its decision bears some fairness. It can be argued that Shoprite’s conduct in this regard was 
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these contractual precepts, precepts that are in harmony with the spirit, purport, and objects of 
the Constitution”.127 
 
It is respectfully submitted that the majority’s overall ruling in Everfresh was unfortunate. 
The incorrect verdict in the case was partly a result of the Court’s failure to fully appreciate 
the courts’ general obligation to develop the common law in line with sections 8(3) and 39(2) 
of the Constitution and the Court’s specific duty to do so in Everfresh.128 As argued by 
Yacoob J, the question whether the Constitution requires courts to encourage good faith in 
contractual dealings and whether the Constitution insists that good faith requirements are 
enforceable should be determined sooner rather than later. Yacoob J reasons that good faith is 
central in business transactions and to contract law in South Africa since many people enter 
into contracts daily and every contract has a potential to be performed in good faith.
129
 The 
Court in Everfresh was fortunate in that it was urged upon by the applicant to develop the 
common law to bring it in line with the objectives of section 39(2).
130
 The Court thus had no 
choice and was indeed duty-bound to develop common law concept of good faith in line with 
the “matrix of the [Constitution’s] normative objective system”.131 The seriousness of the 
obligatory constitutional mandate to develop common law is such that a court may even be 
obliged to raise the question on its own even when parties fail to do so.
132
 In this regard, the 
Court will be expected to then require full argument from parties before making its final 
decision.  
 
Everfresh adds its voice to the growing call that a promise to negotiate in good faith needs to 
be developed beyond existing precedent, in so far as it relates to agreements to agree whose 
enforceability is not yet crystal clear in South African law in the absence of an arbitration 
clause, as demonstrated in 2.3 above.
133
 As such, the obligatory duty imposed on courts to 
develop common law, should have led the Court in Everfresh to follow a two-stage inquiry 
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process as suggested in Carmichele.
134
 According to this proposal (in Carmichele), the Court 
must have investigated whether the common law falls short of the spirit, purport, and objects 
of the Bill of Rights. Where the answer is found to be in the affirmative, which I argue should 
have been the outcome in Everfresh, the Court should then have moved to the second stage of 
the process, and inquired into how such a development was to take place.
135
 A positive 
answer in the first stage of the inquiry should have led to the outcome favoured by Yacoob J, 
and remitting the matter to the High Court appears like a more competent result than the 
opposite outcome, which Moseneke DCJ and the majority preferred, as argued above.          
 
5  CONCLUSION 
In the light of the expositions made in the preceding sections, I reach two closely connected 
conclusions in my critical analysis of the Court’s decision in Everfresh. My first conclusion is 
that the Court misdirected itself when it refused the applicant leave to appeal after concluding 
that no special circumstances existed to require the Court to remit the matter to the High 
Court to consider developing common law to ensure that an agreement to negotiate made in 
good faith is rendered enforceable. The Court arrived at this outcome as a result of making 
incorrect decisions on key legal issues in the matter and by incorrectly concluding that the 
Court had no need discernible to develop common law. As argued and established above, this 
misdirection of the Court was a consequence of its fixation on avoiding prejudice to Shoprite 
without balancing this with an adequate assessment of potential contractual injustice to 
Everfresh.
136
 If the Court had made the correct legal analyses on key issues and was alert to 
its duty to develop the common law, as Yacoob J’s judgement did, the outcome could and 
should in fact have been different.  
  
Was Everfresh another missed opportunity to develop the common law of contract, especially 
settling of the question whether a promise to negotiate in good faith is enforceable? In this 
regard, I further conclude that since it was implicit in Everfresh that good faith needed to be 
developed beyond precedent, the Court’s misdirection on key points resulted in a good 
opportunity to develop the common law principle of good faith being lost. As Yacoob J 
observed in Everfresh, the question whether the spirit, purport, and objects of our 
Constitution require courts to encourage good faith in contractual dealings or whether the 
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Constitution insists that good faith requirements are enforceable is a matter which should be 
determined sooner rather than later.
137
 This legal question remains unsettled and has caused 
controversy in the judiciary in South Africa from the days of Bank of Lisbon
138
 to Barkhuizen 
v Napier.
139
 Bank of Lisbon sowed seeds of expectation of the development of good faith 
when it rejected the exceptio doli generalis as unnecessary since all contracts are bona fidei 
(that is based on good faith). Although it was already known in South African law that all 
contracts are based on good faith,
140
 there was so much expectation with the advent of 
constitutionalism in 1993 and 1996, that good faith would feel the void left by the demise of 
the exceptio doli generalis and contribute towards contractual justice in the new 
constitutional and democratic  South Africa governed by principles such as equity, justice and 
fairness.   
 
It was therefore unsurprising when in 1997 the dissenting judgement of Olivier JA in 
Saayman 
141
generated so much hope and a bit of confusion in the High Courts. The spirit, 
purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights provided impetus for heightened expectation as far 
as the development of the common law of contract is concerned, especially the principle of 
good faith. The little gains good faith enjoyed after Saayman appeared to have been pegged 
back by Drotsky.
142
 When the SCA was expected to make a definitive pronouncement on 
good faith, what followed was disappointing to those who hoped for the development of good 
faith. Drotsky dismissed the views of Olivier JA in Saayman as those of a single judge. Good 
faith, it was disappointingly held, could not be used as “an independent or free-floating basis” 
for setting aside or enforcing contractual provisions. Barkhuizen did not do any better as it 
simply confirmed Drotsky’s position. As demonstrated in 4.2, whether a duty to negotiate in 
good faith is enforceable in the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism presents a grey 
area in South African law. Also as established in 4.2, since Everfresh presented a case for 
developing common law, the Court should, as it is duty-bound, at least have seized the 
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chance to either refer the matter to the High Court for reconsideration, or develop common 
law on its own.  
 
If good faith is indeed the basis of contracts in South Africa, it is inconsistent with sections 
8(3) and 39(2) of the Constitution that good faith still plays a peripheral role in resolving 
contractual disputes. Time has come for the judiciary to develop good faith to become 
enforceable as an independent rule for actively promoting contractual fairness, and not this 
limited supportive role it currently plays.  
 
 
 
